Pentagon Intelligence Report Flags China Theft Risk in Saudi F-35 Sale
A Defense Intelligence Agency assessment introduces a formal counterintelligence obstacle to a proposed arms transfer that would expand F-35 access beyond current NATO and treaty-ally operators.
A Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency report warns that a proposed sale of F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia could allow China to acquire sensitive U.S. Stealth aircraft technology through espionage or direct cooperation with Riyadh, according to the New York Times, which reviewed internal U.S. Government documents dated to September 2026.
The DIA report, described as one of multiple internal assessments circulating within the executive branch, identifies two specific pathways for potential technology compromise: Chinese intelligence operations targeting Saudi military infrastructure, and the possibility of voluntary information sharing between Saudi and Chinese defense establishments. The report does not, according to the Times account, characterize either pathway as confirmed or imminent.
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is produced by Lockheed Martin under a program managed by the F-35 Joint Program Office, a Department of Defense body. The aircraft incorporates radar-absorbing materials, advanced sensor fusion software, and low-observable design features that the U.S. Government classifies at varying levels. Transfer of the aircraft to any foreign government requires a Foreign Military Sale approval under the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778, and is subject to congressional notification under Section 36(b) of that statute for sales above defined dollar thresholds.
No formal FMS case for Saudi F-35s has been publicly posted to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notification database as of September 16, 2026, meaning the sale remains in a pre-notification or deliberative phase. What document would confirm formal initiation is a DSCA congressional notification letter transmitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Saudi Arabia has not been a participant in the F-35 program. Current international operators include the United Kingdom, Australia, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, and Poland, all of which are either NATO members or treaty allies with bilateral defense cooperation agreements that include counterintelligence provisions. Israel became the first Middle East operator under a 2016 FMS agreement.
The intelligence concern over Saudi Arabia centers in part on Riyadh's economic and security relationships with Beijing. Saudi Arabia and China signed a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2022, and the two countries have conducted joint military exercises, according to Chinese state media records cited in open-source defense literature. Whether any specific intelligence sharing agreement between Saudi Arabia and China exists that would bear on F-35 technology is not established in the Times report.
Within Congress, arms sales to Saudi Arabia have drawn repeated scrutiny from members of both parties, particularly following the October 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which the Office of the Director of National Intelligence assessed in a February 2021 declassified report as having been approved by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The Senate voted 56 to 41 in 2019 to block a separate Saudi arms package under the National Emergencies Act, a resolution that was vetoed by President Trump. Vote records are available in the Congressional Record for S.J.Res. 36, 116th Congress.
If a formal F-35 FMS notification is transmitted to Congress, members would have 30 days to pass a joint resolution of disapproval under Section 36(b). A resolution would require a presidential signature or a veto override to take effect, a procedural bar that has not been cleared in any prior Saudi arms sale case.
The Defense Intelligence Agency does not routinely publish its assessments. The existence of the report was disclosed through the Times's reporting on internal documents; the full text has not been released publicly. A Freedom of Information Act request to DIA or a congressional subpoena to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy would be the mechanisms most likely to produce the complete document.
Lockheed Martin, the F-35's prime contractor, declined to comment on potential foreign military sales to the Times, per the article. The Saudi Embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment cited in the same report. The National Security Council and the State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the two executive branch offices most directly involved in FMS policy deliberations, had not issued public statements on the matter as of publication time.
What remains unknown is whether the DIA assessment has been formally transmitted to the National Security Council as a policy input, whether the State Department has issued a preliminary letter of offer and acceptance to Saudi Arabia, and whether any congressional notification process has begun. Those answers would be found in DSCA's public notification database, State Department correspondence logs, and NSC decision memoranda, none of which are currently public.