Intelligence. Accountability. Analysis.
Est. 2022 · Washington, D.C.
The Congressional Times
We follow the data, not the narrative
◆ Live Intelligence
Loading...
Analysis Loading today's analysis...
Follow the Money

DOJ Surveilled Congress Three Times. Records Show Nobody Stopped It.

Across two administrations, the Justice Department used grand jury subpoenas, FISA database queries, and gag orders to monitor the communications of sitting lawmakers — spending from a $38 billion...

Gab-E Political Intelligence Investigation · July 19, 2026

The single most documented fact in three years of federal oversight reporting is this: the Department of Justice issued grand jury subpoenas for the communications records of sitting Members of Congress, their staffers, and at least one minor child — then obtained court orders prohibiting anyone from telling the targets. The DOJ Inspector General, in Report 25-010, confirmed that when these subpoenas were issued in 2017 and 2018, the department had no written policy governing the use of compulsory process against congressional communications and no written policy governing the duration or appropriateness of the non-disclosure orders that kept targets in the dark. The absence of a written rule is not a bureaucratic oversight. It is the condition under which maximum discretion operates with minimum accountability.

The 2017–2018 episode unfolded under Attorney General Jeff Sessions and, later, Acting AG Matthew Whitaker — neither of whom has been charged with any wrongdoing — while Deputy AG Rod Rosenstein oversaw day-to-day DOJ operations. The targets were Representative Adam Schiff (D-CA), then Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; Representative Eric Swalwell (D-CA), then an HPSCI member; 43 congressional staffers with classified access; and family members including a minor child. The OIG's own finding states plainly: all of the individuals whose records were sought 'became aware of the classified information in connection with their congressional responsibilities.' That is the institutional record's language for legitimate congressional oversight. The subpoenas were issued during the same period that AG Sessions publicly announced, on August 4, 2017, that DOJ had tripled the number of leak investigations compared to the prior administration — a figure Sessions himself provided at a DOJ press conference.

The financial architecture of these operations runs through a $38 billion annual DOJ appropriation, as documented in the department's FY2024 Congressional Budget Justification submitted to the Appropriations Committees. The Criminal Division — which houses the Public Integrity Section now required to supervise congressional investigations under November 2023 guidance issued by AG Merrick Garland — carries a budget request of approximately $615 million for FY2024 per the same document. The DOJ Office of Inspector General, which investigated the 2017–2018 episode and published Report 25-010, operates on approximately $130 million annually per its FY2024 Congressional Budget Justification. Not one dollar of these appropriations is itemized in public-facing documents to show what any specific subpoena operation, grand jury proceeding, or non-disclosure order cost the taxpayer. Congress has not required that accounting.

The second documented episode is structurally different and, in civil liberties terms, broader in scope. Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act — reauthorized by Congress in April 2024 without a warrant requirement for U.S. person queries, despite significant legislative debate — the FBI conducted 204,000 warrantless searches of Americans' communications in 2022 alone, according to testimony entered into the congressional hearing record. A DOJ audit cited in that same hearing documented a non-compliance rate equivalent to at least 3,400 civil rights violations per year, or approximately ten per day. Among the confirmed targets of improper warrantless queries: a sitting U.S. Senator, a congressional candidate, a congressional chief of staff, and the spouse of a Member of Congress. None of these individuals has been publicly identified. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, which is funded through the federal judiciary budget without a separately itemized line, approved 100 percent of DOJ surveillance applications in 2022, according to the court's own annual report. FBI Director Christopher Wray presided over the bureau during the period of documented 2022 violations. DNI Avril Haines disclosed the additional improper post-reauthorization searches targeting congressional-adjacent figures.

The policy response to Episode One is instructive precisely because of its timing. DOJ issued formal guidance in November 2023 — under AG Garland — only after the OIG shared its draft report findings. The department self-corrected under investigative pressure, not before the conduct occurred and not as a matter of proactive institutional design. As the legal analysis published by Inside Political Law on November 10, 2023, noted, the issuance of forward-looking guidance 'may signal that DOJ anticipates additional investigations that reach the Hill are forthcoming.' A remedial policy that anticipates future need is not merely bureaucratic housekeeping. It is an institutional acknowledgment that the conditions producing the original conduct remain operative.

The constitutional stakes are specific, not abstract. The Speech or Debate Clause of Article I, Section 6 provides that senators and representatives 'shall not be questioned in any other Place' for 'any Speech or Debate in either House.' Federal courts have interpreted this clause to protect legislative acts — including the receipt and review of classified information in the course of committee oversight — from executive branch compulsion. When the DOJ subpoenas the metadata of an HPSCI member who received a classified briefing in his official capacity, and then gags the communications provider from disclosing the subpoena, the question of whether that process is constitutionally permissible is not settled law. It is an open legal conflict between two branches that has never been adjudicated on these precise facts, in part because the non-disclosure orders prevented the affected members from knowing they had standing to sue until years after the records were produced.

What the documented record shows, taken together, is a pattern across administrations — Republican and Democratic — in which the executive branch's investigative apparatus has reached into congressional communications using legal mechanisms that bypass judicial warrant requirements, operate under secrecy orders that defeat contemporaneous legal challenge, and draw from appropriations accounts that are never itemized at the operational level. The 2017–2018 conduct occurred under a Republican administration. The 2022 FISA violations were documented under a Democratic administration. The April 2024 reauthorization that preserved warrantless U.S. person queries passed with bipartisan support. No single party owns this architecture. Both parties have operated within it and, at critical moments, extended it.

What remains hidden is substantial. The identities of the career prosecutors who signed the 2017–2018 subpoena applications are not in the public record. The communications companies served with those subpoenas are not publicly identified. The identity of the sitting U.S. Senator subjected to a warrantless FISA query has not been disclosed. The specific dollar costs of the subpoena operations, the grand jury proceedings, and the NDO applications are not itemized in any public budget document. The instrument most likely to surface these facts is a combination of: a House or Senate Judiciary Committee subpoena to DOJ for unredacted subpoena applications and sign-off chains from 2017–2018; an amendment to the annual Intelligence Authorization Act requiring the DNI to publicly identify, by title and chamber, any Member of Congress or congressional officer subjected to a warrantless Section 702 query in the prior calendar year; and an Appropriations rider requiring DOJ to submit to Congress a line-item accounting of costs associated with any compulsory process directed at the legislative branch. None of these instruments has been enacted. The records exist. The budget authority to compel their production exists. The decision not to use it is itself a fact in the public record.

Today's Analysis
Loading...
Latest Intelligence
Congressional Intelligence
Loading...
Financial Intelligence
Loading...
Geopolitical Intelligence
Loading...
Follow the MoneyGab-E Political Intelligence Investigation
Loading...
Opinion & Analysis
Loading...
Archive
Loading...
About
Our Mission

We Follow the Data, Not the Narrative

The Congressional Times exists because public records are public — and the analysis built from them should not be exclusive to those who can afford $60,000-a-year intelligence subscriptions.

Every story published in The Congressional Times is sourced to a verifiable public record: a court filing, a Senate lobbying disclosure, an FEC contribution record, a USASpending contract, or a verified news report. We state our sources inline. We show our math. When we are wrong, we say so publicly.

We do not editorialize in news coverage. We do not use loaded language. Both political parties are held to identical standards.

The Follow the Money investigations are the heart of this publication. Each begins with Gab-E Political Intelligence running against 10+ million government records before a single word of editorial is written.

Powered by Gab-E, an elite global intelligence platform built to democratize political and financial intelligence.

Editorial Policy
Editorial Standards & Corrections Policy

How We Source, Verify, and Correct Our Work

Every factual claim in a Congressional Times story is checked against a primary source: a government filing, a court record, a direct quote, before publication. When a claim can't be verified or doesn't hold up as originally reported, we drop it or reframe it. We do not publish disputed claims as settled fact.

When we get it wrong: we correct the story directly, note the correction and date at the bottom of the piece, and update the record. We do not quietly edit and move on.

Bylines: stories with a named byline are written and fact-checked by that person. Stories without a byline are sourced from Gab-E Political Intelligence, our automated research platform, and are labeled as such.

Ownership: The Congressional Times is published by Gab-E Holdings LLC. Gab-E, our intelligence platform, powers our sourcing and research pipeline.

Corrections or concerns: support@gab-e.com